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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 17-2241 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v.  
 
JONATHAN SNYDER, 
 
        Appellant 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-15-cr-00248-002) 
District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sanchez 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 7, 2019 
 
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 30, 2019) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Defendant-appellant Jonathan Snyder appeals the sentence for his four-count 
conviction of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 1343.  His sentence was 37 months’ 
imprisonment, three years of supervised release, a special assessment of $400, and 
restitution of $305,000.  Snyder claims the District Court erred by misapplying the 
Sentencing Guidelines and declining to grant a downward variance.  We perceive no 
error and thus affirm.  
I. Background 
Snyder and another man, Trevor Summers, were co-owners of two companies, 
Resound, LLC and StrawAds, Inc.  Each man owned a substantial interest and exercised 
substantial control over both companies, though Summers had overriding authority when 
he and Snyder disagreed.  The business plan for Resound was to develop a process for 
printing food-grade advertisements on drinking straws, hold the patents for the process, 
and collect royalties when other companies used the patents.  The business plan for 
StrawAds was to produce drinking straws using the patented Resound process.  Investors 
in Resound would be paid from royalties on its patents and investors in StrawAds would 
be paid from proceeds from straw sales.  Between March 2010 and August 2011, 
Summers and Snyder obtained $485,000 in investment capital for the companies and 
hired several employees.   
To entice and retain these employees and investors, Summers and Snyder made 
false representations about their companies’ ownership of patents, machinery, and 
purchase-contracts from big-name customers.  With these and other falsehoods, they 
maintained for a while the illusion of a promising venture.  But the companies never 
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came close to turning a profit.  As they slipped into financial distress, relations broke 
down among Snyder, Summers, their employees, and their investors.  In the end, the 
employees lost their jobs, the investors lost their money, and Snyder and Summers were 
indicted as co-defendants for six counts of wire fraud.  Each of the counts was linked to a 
specific investment in the companies or a specific email sent by Summers or Snyder.  
Summers pled guilty but Snyder went to trial.  He was convicted of four counts 
and acquitted of two.  The convicted counts related to a $110,000 wire transfer from 
“J.C.” in September 2010, a $50,000 wire transfer from “B.M.” in October 2010, a 
$10,000 wire transfer from “P.O.” in December 2010, and an email from Snyder to 
“K.F.” in March 2011.  The acquitted counts related to a $15,000 wire transfer from 
“P.D.” in November 2010 and an email from Summers to “K.F.” in March 2011.  
At sentencing the District Court adopted the facts and Guidelines calculations in 
Snyder’s pre-sentence report.  It established a base offense level of seven, plus a twelve-
level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 because the “actual loss” attributable to 
Snyder was $305,000, plus a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i) 
because the offense involved more than ten victims.  It thus calculated an adjusted 
offense level of 21, which yielded an advisory Guidelines range of 37 to 46 months’ 
imprisonment.  After considering his various objections, the Court sentenced Snyder as 
noted above.  He appeals the sentence to us.1 
                                              
1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
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II. Discussion 
Snyder contends the District Court erred by denying his request for a mitigating-
role adjustment, calculating a loss amount of $305,000 (he says it should have been 
$240,000), and denying his request for a downward variance.  We address each argument 
in turn. 
A. Mitigating Role 
The mitigating-role Guideline “provides a range of adjustments for a defendant 
who plays a part in committing the offense that makes him substantially less culpable 
than the average participant.”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. 3(A).  To determine whether a 
defendant qualifies for a mitigating-role adjustment, the sentencing court must assess the 
relative culpability of the defendant compared to participants in the overall criminal 
activity in which the defendant was involved.  See United States v. Isaza–Zapata, 148 
F.3d 236, 238–39 (3d Cir. 1998).  We have identified several factors that should guide 
this determination, see United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1084 (3d Cir. 1991), and 
the Sentencing Commission has issued further guidance in comments to the 
Guideline, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. 3.  So long as the sentencing court employs the 
correct inquiry, we review the denial of a mitigating-role adjustment for clear error.  
See United States v. Self, 681 F.3d 190, 200 (3d Cir. 2012). 
The District Court addressed Snyder’s request for a mitigating-role adjustment by 
engaging in a detailed comparative analysis between his conduct and that of Summers.  
The Court expressly noted that Snyder understood the scope of the criminal scheme, 
participated directly in decision-making relevant to the scheme, exercised decision-
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making authority over important aspects of it, and stood to benefit personally from its 
success.  
Snyder claims he should have received a mitigating-role adjustment because his 
business partner, Summers, was the driving force behind the scheme.  But even if 
Summers made a greater contribution to that scheme than did Snyder, that does not mean 
the Court was required to grant him a mitigating-role adjustment.  See United States v. 
Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 819 (3d Cir. 2001).  That determination is not so rigid; rather, it 
gives a district court “broad discretion in applying” the adjustment, Isaza-Zapata, 148 
F.3d at 238, so long as it engages in the required comparison and considers relevant 
factors.  The District Court did that here, and we perceive no error in its analysis.  
Although Snyder may have been less culpable than Summers, he nonetheless was 
actively involved in forming and managing the businesses, making written and oral 
representations to investors and employees, and profiting financially (at least 
temporarily) from the various falsehoods he and Summers made.  On this factual record 
we cannot say the Court’s denial of a mitigating-role adjustment was clearly erroneous.   
B. Loss Amount 
For certain economic offenses, including wire fraud, the Guidelines provide 
upward enhancements based on the amount of loss attributable to a defendant’s offense.  
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1.  The Guidelines require an individualized inquiry into the amount of 
loss attributable to a specific defendant.  See United States v. Metro, 882 F.3d 431, 439, 
441 (3d Cir. 2018).  To calculate the loss attributable to Snyder, the District Court started 
from the total $485,000 he and Summers received for their businesses from outside 
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investors.  It then excluded $180,000 invested by S.K. ($150,000), S.C. ($20,000), and 
T.A. ($10,000), yielding a loss amount of $305,000.  That resulted in a twelve-level 
enhancement because it is greater than $250,000 and not greater than $550,000.  U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(G)–(H).  The Court declined Snyder’s request to exclude investments 
made by B.C. ($50,000) and P.D. ($15,000).  Had it excluded those investments, 
Snyder’s loss amount would have been $240,000 and his adjusted offense level would 
have been two levels lower.  See id. § (b)(1)(F)–(G).  
Snyder contends the District Court should have excluded the $50,000 investment 
by B.C. in August 2011 because, by that time, Snyder was extricating himself from the 
relationship with Summers and had no intention of seeking further investment.  In other 
words, Snyder argues that B.C.’s investment was not “(i) within the scope of [his] jointly 
undertaken criminal activity, (ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity, and (iii) 
reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity,” as would be required to 
impute the investment to him under the Guidelines.  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).  But 
the District Court rejected these arguments at sentencing based on its factual finding that 
Snyder was still involved in the companies as a partner when B.C. made the investment.  
We review that application of the Guidelines to Snyder’s specific factual circumstances 
for abuse of discretion, see Metro, 882 F.3d at 437, and we perceive none.  The Court 
was within its discretion to reject Snyder’s contention that he had so extricated himself 
from the companies’ affairs by August 2011 that he was no longer a participant in the 
fraudulent scheme or was unable to foresee that Summers would continue the companies’ 
practice of obtaining investment to shore up declining finances.   
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Snyder also contends the Court should have excluded the $15,000 investment by 
P.D. in November 2010 because, according to him, he could not reasonably have 
foreseen it.  To support this argument, he emphasizes that the jury acquitted him of Count 
Three of the indictment, which was premised on the $15,000 investment by P.D.  His 
theory is that the jury must have concluded he was not responsible for P.D.’s investment, 
which, he says, precludes the sentencing court from including that investment in his loss 
amount.  But the jury’s acquittal on the fraud count related to P.D.’s investment does not 
compel the Court to disregard that investment at sentencing and cannot be interpreted to 
mean the jury made any specific factual finding.  See United States v. Ciavarella, 716 
F.3d 705, 735–36 (3d Cir. 2013) (“‘[A] jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the 
sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge so long as that 
conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.’” (quoting United States v. 
Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997))).  To the contrary, the District Court had discretion at 
sentencing to include P.D.’s investment in Snyder’s loss amount under the 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.  See id.  Given the record evidence of Snyder’s 
ownership, control, and management of the companies, as well as his direct involvement 
in soliciting investment from the man who brought in P.D.’s investment, the Court was 
within its discretion to conclude that investment was reasonably foreseeable to Snyder.  
In summary, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining Snyder’s 
request to exclude from his loss amount the investments by B.C. and P.D.  
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C. Downward Variance  
Snyder claims the District Court erred by denying his request for a downward 
variance.  To make this argument, he invokes the general rule that a sentence under 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) must be “‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary,’ to accomplish 
the goals of sentencing.”  Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007) (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).  We review the District Court’s denial of a downward variance for 
abuse of discretion.  Id. at 111.   
Snyder says he should have received a sentence of 24 months of house arrest 
without any term of imprisonment.  In making this argument, he essentially disputes the 
weight the Court gave to various sentencing considerations.  He claims it should have 
shown more leniency in light of his lack of criminal history, his family’s reliance on him, 
his need to continue working to pay restitution, his good character as attested by various 
witnesses, his low likelihood of reoffending, and his charitable work in the community.  
But Snyder does not suggest the Court failed entirely to consider these factors or 
otherwise commit any procedural error under § 3553(a).  Accordingly, he cannot 
establish that it erred in denying the variance unless he shows that “no reasonable 
sentencing court” would have done so.  See United States v. Harris, 751 F.3d 123, 129 
(3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 567, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en 
banc)).  And he fails to make that showing here.  The record shows the Court carefully 
considered each of the mitigating factors Snyder now highlights and carefully weighed 
the relevant factors under § 3553(a).  The sentence may have been greater than what 
Snyder requested, but it was at the bottom of the Guidelines range.  See United States v. 
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Woronowicz, 744 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Sentences within the Guidelines range 
are more likely to be reasonable than those that fall outside this range.” (quotation 
omitted)).  Indeed it was a lenient sentence given that Snyder was convicted of four 
counts of wire fraud based on falsehoods he told for his own financial gain, with more 
than ten victims and more than $300,000 in financial loss.  Under these circumstances we 
cannot conclude the Court abused its discretion in declining to grant Snyder a downward 
variance from the Guidelines range.  
* * * * * 
We sustain none of the errors Snyder claims on appeal and thus affirm. 
